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iv 
Nature of the Case. 
This appeal relates to certain causes of action pled by plaintiff/appellant American 
Semiconductor, Inc. ("ASI") against defendants/respondents Zilog, Inc. ("Zilog"), Sage Silicon 
Solutions, LLC ("Sage"), and David Roberts, Gyle Yearsley and William Tiffany (the 
"Individual Defendants"), arising from Zilog's retention of Sage to provide engineering services 
(including design verification, design and layout services) to Zilog on a Zilog microcontroller 
project called Z8F6482 or Z82 (the "Z82 Project"). 
ASI' s case against Zilog began primarily as a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. 
When ASI could not demonstrate the existence of any trade secret, it dismissed its trade secret 
claim against all defendants. See § I.B., infra. ASI then switched its focus to the tortious 
interference claims arising from Zilog's retention of Sage as an independent contractor to 
provide engineering services on the Z82 Project instead of ASL 
ASI tried its case on two theories against Zilog: tortious interference with contract 
("TIWK") and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage ("TIWPEA"). At trial, 
the only evidence of damages ASI presented under either theory concerned alleged lost profits it 
claimed it would have made from contracting with Zilog on the Z82 Project. In addition, rather 
than contracting with a third party, ASI never bid on the Z82 Project, either at the outset of that 
project or after ASI forced Sage off the project. Instead, as ASI admits, its alleged lost profits 
were based on a "quote" that ASI created during litigation, after suit was filed. See § I.C.5, infra. 
According to that after-the-fact quote, ASI would have charged Zilog approximately $238 per 
1 
same same 
Sage for $65 per hour. 
On the eve of jury deliberations, Judge Neville granted a partial directed verdict to Zilog, 
dismissing ASI's TIWPEA claim because ASI failed to introduce any evidence of damages, 
other than damages resulting from ASI's alleged loss of the opportunity to contract with Zilog on 
the Z82 Project. See§ III.A.2, infra. 1 ASI appeals from Judge Neville's decision on the partial 
directed verdict, contending that "ASI has consistently and clearly asserted that Zilog 
intentionally interfered with its prospective economic advantage with its employees," Appellant 
ASI's Opening Brief ("ASI Op. Brief') at 36 (emphasis in original). This argument is nothing 
more than semantics. Although ASI may have had an expectation of earning profits from the 
· outsourced design services of its employees separate and apart from work outsourced to Zilog, 
the only "profit" ASI introduced at trial concerned lost profit from "design work that would have 
been outsourced to AS/ from Zilog." ASI Op. Brief at 43; see also id. at 48 (ASI's damages 
were "the profits ASI would have realized from contracting with Zilog on the project."). ASI's 
claim fails as a matter of law because Zilog was the only economic source of ASI's alleged lost 
profits and it was not a third party to ASI's alleged economic expectancy. See § III.A.3, infra. 
Separately, even if ASI's economic expectancy were not premised on contracting with Zilog, 
ASI's claim would fail because ASI did not introduce evidence of any contractual opportunity or 
1 Judge Neville did submit to the jury ASI's TIWK claim against Zilog, i.e., whether Zilog 
intentionally interfered with the noncompetition provisions of ASI's employment contracts with 
the Individual Defendants who performed the engineering work. The jury returned a unanimous 
verdict in favor of Zilog, finding that Zilog did not interfere with ASI' s employment contracts 
with the Individual Defendants. R 1632-1636, at 1634. ASI did not appeal the jury's verdict in 
favor of Zilog on this TIWK claim. 
2 
to 
establish a prima facia claim of TIWPEA See § III.AA, infra. 
As to the remaining defendants, the jury returned a verdict in favor of ASI finding that 
Sage and the Individual Defendants intentionally interfered with ASI's economic expectancy in 
contracting with Zilog. ASI asked the jury to award ASI approximately $1.2 million in lost 
profits, but the jury awarded ASI only $195,175 in lost profits. The major difference between 
the amount of damages awarded to ASI and the amount of damages sought by ASI concerned 
ASI' s alleged lost profits related to charges for the use of ASI' s ( alleged) computer assisted 
design ("CAD") tools ("Design Tools"). See § I.C.5, infra. 
On appeal, ASI seeks entry of an order vacating the $195,175 lost profit award against 
Sage and the Individual Defendants and remanding the case for a new trial on damages ( only) 
against all defendants, including Zilog. ASI's request for a new trial on damages primarily 
involves a discovery-related issue based on ASI's argument that Judge Neville erred in denying 
ASI's motion to compel Zilog to produce its software license agreement with nonparty 
Synopsys, Inc. ("Synopsys") for Design Tools used on the Z82 Project. ASI contends that the 
denial of its motion to compel affected ASI' s substantial rights at trial by precluding ASI from 
presenting evidence that Zilog (allegedly) did not have the Synopsys tools and license in place as 
of March 2011. ASI Op. Brief at 32. ASI also contends that the denial of its motion to compel 
production of the Synopsys license affected ASI's substantial rights in that "ASI was deprived of 
an opportunity to impeach Mr. Staab with regard to whether Zilog did, in point of fact, have the 
tools and licenses in place as of March 2011 when the Sage Defendants commenced work on the 
6482 Project." Id. at 33. 
3 
a not 
a Synopsys, the supplier of the principal Design Tools selected by Zilog on the 
Z82 Project. See § I.C.6, infra. ASI could have included the cost of obtaining a Synopsys 
license as part of its damages model at trial, but chose not to do so. Instead, ASI attempted to 
recover "lost profit" for its use of Synopsys Design Tools that ASI admittedly did not have, and 
the jury correctly rejected ASI's improper attempt to recover lost profits related to Design Tools 
that ASI did not have. 
In addition, ASI' s contention-that disclosure of the Synopsys license would have 
supported ASI' s theory that Zilog did not have a license with Synopsys in or about March 
2011-is without merit. In ASI' s testimony and briefing before the District Court, ASI admitted 
that Design Tools are a necessary component of designing a microcontroller, meaning that Sage 
could not have performed its work on the Z82 Project without using Synopsys Design Tools. In 
this case, as the District Court advised ASI, the Synopsys license reviewed by the District Court, 
in camera, is an addendum to a master license agreement with IXYS dating back to 2004. See 
§ I.C.2, infra. 
Moreover, ASI is fully aware that Synopsys objected to the production of its license 
agreement with Zilog. Prior to trial, ASI served Synopsys with a third-party subpoena seeking 
production of the license agreement. Synopsys expressly objected to ASI's attempt to obtain its 
proprietary and confidential license agreement. See § III.B.2 and 3, infra. Specifically, 
Synopsys objected to disclosure because the agreement was irrelevant and contained 
"confidential information belonging to Synopsys and its customers subject to third party 
confidentiality agreements." See § III. B.2 and 3, infra. ASI made no attempt to enforce the 
4 
to 
agreement over Synopsys' Objections and without Synopsys' input. Then, when 
Zilog said it would produce the license agreement if ASI would obtain Synopsys' written consent 
to disclosure of the license agreement, ASI made no effort to obtain such consent. 
Separately, ASl's contention-that the District Court erred in compelling Zilog to 
produce a copy of the Synopsys license over the objections of Synopsys-is hypocritical. ASI 
refused to produce any of its own licensing agreements despite claiming ASI had such 
agreements "in place prior to or at the time the Sage Defendants worked on the 6482 Project." 
ASI argued that its agreements were irrelevant and that disclosure would result in a "breach by 
AS/ of an obligation to a third-party to maintain such information as confidential." See 
§ IILB.6, irifra. ASI is judicially estopped from advancing an argument on appeal that the 
District Court abused its discretion in holding that Zilog's license agreements were irrelevant, 
because ASI took the exact same position when asked to produce its own license agreements and 
thereby avoided production of those agreements. 
Finally, by failing to present any evidence of its own Synopsys license, ASI rendered 
Zilog's Synopsys license irrelevant, thereby further legitimizing Judge Neville's decision to deny 
ASI's motion to compel. Since ASI did not have a license to use Synopsys tools, ASI could not 
recover damages in the form of "lost profits" against the defendants for charges associated with 
the use of Synopsys Design Tools. Therefore, even if this Court were to reverse Judge Neville's 
discovery orders and remand for a new trial on damages, ASI would still be unable to prove its 
entitlement to "lost profits" related to Design Tools. 
5 
Proceedings Below. 
Zilog disagrees with the substance of ASI's contentions on appeal with regard to the 
dismissal of ASI' s claims against Zilog for misappropriation of trade secrets and the District 
Court's prevailing party determination A detailed background of the procedural history 
concerning the disposition of ASI' s claims against Zilog for misappropriation of trade secrets 
can be found in the Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs (R 2114-
2134), entered by the District Court on February 23, 2015. 
C. Statement of the Facts. 
Zilog is an integrated circuit manufacturer engaged in the design and manufacture of 
microcontrollers. Tr p. 1519, L. 16 - p. 1520, L. 2. In early 2010, Zilog was acquired by IXYS 
Corporation ("IXYS"). Tr p. 2217, LL. 14-19. At that time, Zilog became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of IXYS. Tr p. 2217, L. 24 - p. 2218, L. 1; id. p. 1513, LL. 19-22. Zilog's sister 
company, Clare, is also a subsidiary of IXYS, with design engineers. Tr p. 2217, L. 20 -
p. 2218, L. 7. 
The Individual Defendants are former Zilog design engineers who worked at Zilog's 
facility in Meridian, Idaho, until 2009. David Roberts worked for Zilog as a Design Manager III. 
Tr p. 1785, LL. 18-23. Prior to his layoff, Roberts reported to David Staab, Zilog's Vice 
President of R&D and MCU (microprocessor) Architecture, who worked at Zilog's headquarters 
in Milpitas, California. Tr p. 1830, LL. 11-25; id. p. 2211, LL. 7-9. After Roberts left Zilog, he 
kept in contact with Staab. Tr p. 1830, L. 13 p. 1831, L. 7; id. p 2255, L. 24 - p. 2256, L. 8. 
In June 2009, Zilog began considering development of a low power microcontroller. 
Tr p. 2218, L. 17 - p. 2219, L. 22. Staab was team leader of the new microcontroller project. 
6 
1, same 
microcontroller project with Roberts. p. 1832, L. 14 - p. 1833, L. On October 21, 2009, 
Roberts sent a follow-up e-mail to Staab notifying him that Roberts, and the other Individual 
Defendants, were forming their own company, Sage, and were available through Sage to perform 
design work for Zilog. See Trial Exhibit ("Ex.") 2-G. Specifically, Roberts represented: 
Just wanted to let you know we are up and running and looking for design work. 
Gyle, Bill, Russ and myself have started Sage Silicon Solutions and can help 
you when you need design work. We have a test chip going out in December with 
American Semiconductor and hope to offer ultra low power IP and design 
services using their Flexfet technology. We are not limited to using American 
Semiconductor, but [t]hey are being very helpful and I hope it turns into a very 
lucrative relationship. No money involved yet but that will come. 
Let me know if there is any design work you would like us to quote. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
Staab replied that he would keep Roberts informed when design work came up. Id. By 
the end of 2010, the exact type of microcontroller Zilog wanted to develop had been defined and 
a business case for what was to become the Z82 Project was opened. The Z82 Project was based 
on an existing Zilog microchip (identified as the EZ8 Core). Tr p. 2219, L. 23 -p. 2220, L. 10. 
Thereafter, Zilog investigated options on how to best staff the project. Tr p. 2235, L. 5 -
p. 223 7, L. 1. One of the options Zilog considered was doing the work completely in-house 
using just Staab and Theo Verhoeven, two Zilog engineers experienced in microcontroller 
design, combined with engineers and designers from Clare. Zilog also considered combining the 
use of Zilog and Clare engineers with external contract help. Tr p. 2238, L. 18 - p. 2239, L. 4; 
id. p. 2241, LL. 6-14. 
7 
resources to 
team bringing on Sage. Tr p. 2239, L. 15 - p. 2240, L. 10. Because Sage was made up of a 
team of former Zilog engineers, the Individual Defendants started with experience in 
microcontroller design (Tr p. 2241, LL. 20-23) and, of course, familiarity with Zilog products 
and personnel. With the availability of Sage as an independent contractor on the Z82 project, 
Zilog did not need to consider other outside resources. Id. p. 2239, L. 15 - p. 2240, L. 10. 
1. In February 2011 Zilog retained Sage to augment the team on the Z82 
Project. 
In February 2011, Zilog retained Sage as an independent contractor on the Z82 Project. 
Tr p. 230 I, LL. 19-24; Ex. 2-FF at Z000036. Sage agreed to provide design and logic/circuit 
simulation services on the Z82 Project at the rate of $65 per hour and full custom layout design 
and verification services at the rate of $45 per hour. R 5004-5022; Ex. 118. In providing 
services in connection with the Z82 Project, Sage did not provide or charge Zilog for the use of 
any Design Tools.. Tr p. 1951, L. 25 - p. 1952, L. 3; Ex. 118. 
2. Zilog possessed the Design Tools necessary for the work on the Z82 
Project. 
The primary Design Tools used by Sage on the Z82 project was licensed to Zilog by 
Synopsys. R 5004-5022, at 5007. As Judge Neville advised ASI, IXYS obtained a Purchase 
Agreement from Synopsys, which was an addendum to an End User Software License and 
Maintenance Agreement dating back to 2004 for the use of Synopsys Design Tools. Tr p. 1468. 
Thus, Zilog possessed the Design Tools necessary for work on the Z82 Project when Sage's 
work on the project began. R 5004-5022, at 5007; Tr p. l 951, L. 11 - p. 1952, L. 7. Sage 
worked on the Z82 Project for approximately seven months, from March 2011 through the end of 
8 
Synopsys, 
would not receive any benefit by paying for duplicate tools. R 5004-5022, at 5007. Paying for 
duplicate or even comparable tools would have been an unnecessary double expense to Zilog. 
Id. This is especially true where, as here, ASI sought to charge Zilog approximately $810,000 
for Design Tools. 
3. ASI did not advise Staab of its hope of contracting with Zilog for 
outsourced design work. 
At the time Zilog made the decision to hire Sage, Staab (the Z82 team leader and 
individual at Zilog responsible for outsourcing design work) was unaware that ASI had an 
expectancy of performing work on the Z82 Project. Tr p. 2342, LL. 7-9. 
In 2003, about eight years before the Z82 Project, Zilog had outsourced design work to 
ASI on a single occasion (the "2003 Project"). Tr p. 2320, L. 19 - p. 2321, L. 12; id. p. 868, 
L. 16 - p. 869, L. 8. On that occasion, Staab contacted ASI's President, Doug Hackler, via 
e-mail to perform some layout work for Zilog. Tr p. 2342, LL. 11-20. ASI performed that 
layout design work for Zilog. Tr p. 1129, LL. 8-12; id. p. 803, LL. 4-7. ASI's billables to Zilog 
for the 2003 Project were approximately $26,000. Ex. I-TT; Tr p. 1190, LL. 3-12; id. p. 1191, 
L. 25 p. 1192, L. 24. ASI did not use its own Design Tools to perform its services on the 2003 
Project. Instead, ASI performed its services at Zilog's site using Zilog's Design Tools. Id. 
Thus, Zilog had never obtained Design Tools from ASL 
After the 2003 Project concluded, Doug Hackler never followed up with Staab regarding 
Zilog's need for outsourced work. Tr p. 2342, L. 15 - p. 2343, L. 12. Although Staab's e-mail 
address at Zilog was the same in 2011 as it was in 2003, Hackler made no effort to contact Staab 
by e-mail or phone at any time during the eight years since ASI performed work on the 2003 
9 
to 
marketing efforts and that Zilog was not listed or identified as a potential customer in 2009, 2010 
or 201 L Tr p. 869, L. 12 - p. 870, L. 9. Instead, according to Hackler, he had a chance 
encounter at an airport with Rick White in 2010, who was then Zilog's vice-president of 
worldwide operations. Tr p. 837, LL. 2-23. According to Hackler, he informed White that ASI 
had hired the Individual Defendants and that ASI was interested in performing outsourced work 
for Zilog. Tr p. 837, L. 14 - p. 839, L. 25. According to Hackler, he got "the impression" that 
White would convey this information to others at Zilog. Id 
White remembered the conversation very differently. See Tr p. 1644, L. 18 - p. 1646, 
L. 3. White testified: 
Q. Did Mr. Hackler, during that conversation or at any other time, tell you 
that he or his company had -- ASI had hired or was employing Dave Roberts, 
Gyle Yearsley, Bill Tiffany, Russell Lloyd, or Evelyn Perryman? 
A. No. 
Q. Do [sic] he ever indicate to you that ASI wanted to provide design 
services to Zilog? 
A. No. 
Tr p. 1644, L. 22 - p. 1645, L. 11. Moreover, White testified that he never told Staab that ASI 
wished to provide design services to Zilog: 
Q. Did Mr. Hackler -- did you ever convey any message from Mr. Hackler to 
David Staab regarding ASI's desire to provides design services to Zilog? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And I mean at any time did you convey that to --
A. No, sir. 
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A. I didn't. 
1645, L. 22 - p. 1646, L. Thus, prior to late-September 2011, Staab (2ilog's 282 Project 
lead) was unaware that ASI had an expectancy of doing the work that Sage performed for 2ilog, 
Tr p. 2342, LL. 1-6, and could not have intentionally interfered with any such expectancy. 
4. ASI demands that Zilog terminate Sage from the Z82 Project. 
On or about September 24, 2011, ASI contacted Staab at his office in Milpitas, 
California, informed him that the Individual Defendants were employed at ASI and should not be 
working for 2ilog, and demanded that 2ilog terminate its contract with Sage. Tr p. 856, L. 21 
p. 857, L. 23. Although ASI claims that it had an expectation of doing the work that Sage was 
performing, ASI made no representation to Staab during the telephone call that ASI expected to 
use the Individual Defendants to work on the 282 Project. Tr p. 2342, LL. 1-10 (D. Staab Trial 
Testimony). See also Tr p. 1475, L. 12 - p. 1478, L. 10 (ASI's Director of Design and Test Dale 
Wilson's Trial Testimony). Pursuant to ASI's demand, 2ilog terminated Sage from the 282 
Project on or about September 27, 2011. Ex. 1-FFFF; Tr p. 2361, LL. 3-19; id. p. 2362, 
LL. 7-23. 2ilog then completed the 282 Project on its own, using internal resources, including 
engineers employed by 2ilog and its sister company, Clare. Tr p. 2239, LL. 5-10; id. p. 2248, 
LL. 2-13. 2ilog completed the tape-out of the 282 Project in late December 2012 or early 
January 2013. Tr p. 2313, LL. 7-9. (Tape out is the milestone when the design is complete 
enough to send to the master vendor to develop the plates for the microcontroller. Tr p. 1994, 
LL. 8-16.) 
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ASI never submitted a bid or worked on the Z82 Project. 
never submitted a bid to Zilog or worked on the Z82 Project. See Tr p. 2317, L. 
p. 2318, L. 10 (D. Staab Trial Testimony) ("[Zilog] didn't receive this quote as a business 
proposition."). Instead, ASI prepared a quote for litigation purposes, indicating that ASI would 
have performed the work on the Z82 Project at a rate of $238 per hour. Tr p. 1134, LL. 10-13 
(ASI's Chief Financial Officer Lorelli Hackler's Trial Testimony) ("Exhibit 101 is a quote that 
we prepared, in hindsight, basically. We were asked to say what we would have done this work 
for Zilog; if we - if we had bid the work, how what would we have bid."). Staab, Zilog's team 
leader on the Z82 Project, testified that the rate of $238 per hour was too high to be acceptable to 
Zilog and that Zilog would not have retained ASI to work on the Z82 Project at that rate. 
Tr p. 2317, L. 22 -p. 2319, L. 23; Ex. 101. See also R 5004-5022, at 5009. 
6. ASI did not have a Synopsys license or the tools necessary to perform 
design services on the Z82 Project. 
Design Tools are a necessary component of performing design work on a microcontroller 
project like the Z82 Project. As ASI's General Manager, Richard Chaney, testified at trial: 
Q. As you understand it when ASI bid on projects like this one did someone 
have to provide the tools to do the work? 
A. Well, yeah. You always have to have tools to do design work. So 
they're gonna be provided somehow. 
Q. And did someone have to incur the cost of providing those tools? 
A. I've never known any of the tool vendors to give anything away for free, 
so my assumption would be yes. 
Tr. p. 1354, L. 17 - p. 1355, L. 1 (emphasis added). See also id p. 1316, LL. 11-13 ("Anybody 
that does [ microcontroller design] has to have design tools. You can't just draw it; you have to 
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vendor chosen Zilog with respect to the Z82 As ASI's General Manager Richard 
Cheney testified: 
Q. All right. Between 2009 and September of 2011, when my clients were 
terminated, did ASI ever have a Synopsys license? 
A. Not that I'm aware. We chose Cadence and and Silvaco [sic] tool sets 
over Synopsys. 
Tr p. 1336, L. 22 - p. 1337, L. 1. In fact, the testimony at trial from the Individual Defendants 
(who were the only persons with actual knowledge of the Design Tool~ used by Zilog on the Z82 
Project and the Design Tools used by ASI) uniformly confirmed that ASI did not have the tools 
necessary to pe,form the Z82 Project. Tr p. 2000, LL. 1-8 (G. Yearsley's Trial Testimony); 
Tr p. 1925, LL. 18-25 (D. Roberts' Trial Testimony); id p. 1971, LL. 10-19 (W. Tiffany's Trial 
Testimony). 
According to the trial testimony of ASI's own damages expert, Richard Hoffman, if ASI 
had to acquire tools for the Z82 Project, the purchase price (for the necessary software licenses) 
would not be a "profit," but a "cost" that must be subtracted from ASI's lost profits: 
Q. Well, let's -- let's look at tools. Tools is the largest item here? 
A. That's true. 
Q. Okay. So, let's -- let's just talk about tools themselves. If -- what your 
assumption is, is that ASI had the tools to the -- do the job, and they wouldn't 
have to acquire any additional tools? 
2 See also R 1262 (ASI's Memorandum In Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine No. 11 
Re: Zilog's Undisclosed Licenses) (ASI states: "Third party tools were undoubtedly used in 
connection with the project at issue. They necessarily would have been purchased by Zilog or 
Sage to do the work that was done, and they were surely a component of the cost incurred on the 
project."). 
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that this is calculated, true. assumes 
could be used to do the job; that's right. 
Q. So, if we were to use a different assumption, that assumption being that 
ASI would have to acquire new and different tools, at a cost, then that would be a 
cost that would have to be subtracted? 
A. Yeah. If -- if the assumption is that ASI has to pay for something that it 
didn't -- that it didn't own, then down -- down here I would add a line item that 
said, purchase whatever tool you just told me that to assume, and I'd put that in 
there. 
Tr p. 2111, L. 22- p. 2112, L. 15. 
ASI never introduced any evidence at trial regarding what ASI would have been required 
to pay Synopsys to obtain the tools necessary for ASI to bid for or do the work on the Z82 
Project. Thus, ASI failed to meet its burden of establishing the profit, if any, that ASI allegedly 
could have made by providing Synopsys tools on the Z82 Project. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Zilog requests attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rules 11.2, 40 and 41, and Idaho Code Section 12-121. "Under LC.§ 12-121, a party is entitled 
to attorney's fees if the appeal merely invites the appellate court to second guess the trial court 
on the weight of evidence." Doble v. Interstate Amusements, Inc., No. 42744, 2016 WL 
1757440, at *3 (Idaho May 3, 2016) (citing Kelley v. Yadon, 150 Idaho 334, 338, 247 P.3d 199, 
203 (2011)). 
In addition, as detailed in Zilog's Motion to Augment filed this date, Sage and the 
Individual Defendants have already paid the $195,175 lost profit damage award to ASI and ASI 
has recovered the full amount of its damages under the jury's verdict and the District Court's 
judgments. Thus, ASI's appeal of the District Court's directed verdict on ASI's TIWPEA claim 
against Zilog is moot and nonjusticiable-unless ASI can prevail on appeal on its argument that 
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prevented 
from giving a "full representation of its damages case" to the jury. See Bob Rice Ford, Inc. 
v. Donnelly, 98 Idaho 313,315, 563 P.2d 37, 39 (1977) (holding that issues raised by appellant 
on appeal were moot and dismissing appeal because respondent paid final judgment prior to oral 
argument); Walker v. Budzianowski, 103 Idaho 244, 245, 646 P.2d 1015, 1016 (1982) (holding 
that questions presented by plaintiff-appellant on appeal were rendered moot by defendant-
respondent's offer to pay the full amount of judgment); Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 160 
Idaho 181, _, 370 P.3d 384, 392 (2016) (2016 WL 937694) ("Mootness applies when a 
favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief. This Court may only review cases in 
which a judicial determination will have a practical effect on the outcome."). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting a Directed Verdict Dismissing 
ASI' s TIWPEA Claim Against Zilog. 
1. Standard of review re: directed verdict. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) allows a party to move for a directed verdict at the 
close of the opposing party's case. "When reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion for a 
directed verdict, this Court applies the same standard the trial court applied when originally 
ruling on the motion." April Beguesse, Inc. v. Rammell, 156 Idaho 500, 508-09, 328 P.3d 480, 
488-89 (2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As this Court stated: 
The Court determines whether there was sufficient evidence to justify submitting 
the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse evidence and drawing every 
legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a directed 
verdict. This test does not require the evidence be uncontradicted, but only that it 
be of sufficient quantity and probative value that reasonable minds could 
conclude that a verdict in favor of the party against whom the motion is made is 
proper. Where a non-moving party produces sufficient evidence from which 
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56 Idaho at 509, 328 P.3d at 489 (quotation marks omitted); see also Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 
759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986) ("Whether a verdict should be directed ... is a pure 
question of law and on those questions, the parties are entitled to a full review by the appellate 
court without special deference to the views of the trial court." Id. (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, 9 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2536 at 595 (1971 & Supp. 1985). Wright & Miller 
§ 2536 states: "[T]he reviewing court may affirm a grant of judgment as a matter of law on any 
grounds supported in the record." Id. at 595. 
ASI cites two cases as authority for its position that Zilog, in seeking to uphold the 
District Court's directed verdict in Zilog's favor, is limited to raising arguments raised below: 
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1984), and Gen. Auto Parts Co. 
v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 856, 979 P.2d 1207, 1214 (1999). Neither case conflicts 
with Wright & Miller's statement or Zilog's position that this Court may affirm on any grounds 
supported by the record, because in each of the cases cited by ASI, the appellant was challenging 
the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict.3 
2. Proceedings re: ASl's claim for TIWPEA. 
On appeal, ASI contends that it "has been consistent with regard to the nature of its claim 
against Zilog for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage." ASI Op. Brief 
3 See Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 139, 686 P.2d 79, 84 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Issues 
two and three are also framed in terms of the denial of the Corporation's motion for a directed 
verdict.") (emphasis added); Gen. Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 855, 979 
P.2d 1207, 1213 (1999) ("GPC cross appealed the district court's decision denying its motion for 
directed verdict on General's breach of contract claim.") ( emphasis added). 
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statement untrue. 
n-i-,,. ... -i-,, ... ,,.r1 with ASI' s prospective economic advantage in providing services to third parties, not 
Zilog. As it related to ASI's claim for TIWPEA, ASI pied in pertinent part: 
90. In addition, by soliciting or accepting services from the Individuals and 
Sage, Zilog tortiously interfered with American Semiconductor's prospective 
economic advantage, including depriving American Semiconductor of the 
opportunities to earn income from the Individuals' design services. 
91. Zilog was aware that American Semiconductor had, in the past, sought to 
provide services to third parties, and would, in the future, continue to seek to 
provide such services. 
92. In addition, Zilog was necessarily aware that its solicitation or acceptance 
of the services of the Individuals and Sage would, and did, inte,fere with 
American Semiconductor's provision of services to third parties. 
R 433-454, at 445-446 (emphasis added). 
On August 29, 2014, Zilog moved for summary judgment against ASI (R 1009-1014; 
R 3017-3047), arguing that Zilog was entitled to summary judgment dismissing ASI's TIWPEA 
claim because a defendant cannot interfere with a plaintiffs prospective economic relationship 
with that same defendant, i.e., with itself. R 3034-3035, citing BECO Constr. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, 
145 Idaho 719, 724, 184 P.3d 844, 849 (2008); Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 138, 
191 P.3d 205,216 (2008). 
ASI opposed Zilog's motion for summary judgment on ASI's TIWPEA claim on the 
grounds that ASI' s claim was not based upon the theory that Zilog interfered with an opportunity 
between ASI and Zilog. R 3768-3808, at 3785 (ASI argued: "ASI IS NOT ASSERTING 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE BASED UPON ZILOG'S INTERFERENCE AS TO AN 
OPPORTUNITY AS BETWEEN ASI AND ZILOG") ( capitalization and emphasis in 
original). According to ASI, Zilog interfered in two ways that were allegedly unconnected to 
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Defendants' services to its customers and potential customers; and (2) Zilog's wrongful 
interference caused ASI to lose three of its senior design engineers, Roberts, Yearsley, and 
Tiffany, upon whom ASI was depending in order to continue with and grow its design 
engineering services business. According to ASI's summary judgment opposition papers, "[a]s a 
result of Zilog's wrongful interference, ASI had to expend $75,491.91 for recruiting and training 
the new replacement engineers." Id. at 3806 ( citations omitted). Based on these representations, 
the trial court denied Zilog's motion for summary judgment on ASI's TIWPEA claim. 
Prior to trial, Zilog filed a motion in limine (R 1235-1238) and supporting memorandum 
(R 1239-1246), arguing that ASI should be judicially estopped from advancing an argument at 
trial that ASI's economic expectancy was actually based on ASI's prospective relationship with 
Zilog. Id at 1244-1245. ASI opposed the motion (R 1303-1308). At the hearing on Zilog's 
motion, counsel for ASI made the following representations to the Court: 
In reaching its conclusions, following a hearing on September 26th, the Court 
noted ASI's characterization of its tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage claim against Zilog as being premised on, quote, the 
economic expectancy ASI had for Roberts, Yearsley, Tiffany, Lloyd, and 
Perryman's continued employment loyalty, and is not based on ASI's prospective 
relationship with Zilog. 
Nothing has changed, Your Honor. That is still the case, and those are still the 
facts. 
What is being confused here is that, in effect, the anticipated benefits of the work 
that these individuals would have done for AS/, but for their breaches of their 
Employee Confidentiality Agreements, depend in part on - on a measure of lost 
profits based on what they derived and AS/ might have derived from Zilog. 
Tr p. 332, L. 17 - p. 333, L. 8 (emphasis added). 
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Nor ASI identify at trial any lost business opportunities with which Zilog allegedly 
interfered. Rather, the only damages ASI sought to recover at trial concerned alleged profits 
AS/ would have realized from contracting with Zilog. Tr p. 2063, LL. 11-16; R 4085-4372, at 
4089 and 4094. At the close of ASI's case in chief, Zilog moved for directed verdict as to ASI's 
TIWPEA claim, and the District Court denied Zilog's motion at that time. 
At the close of all the evidence, the parties conferred with the Court to finalize special 
jury instructions. Given that: ( 1) ASI had failed to offer evidence of any third parties with which 
ASI claimed Zilog's "solicitation or acceptance of the services of the Individuals and Sage" 
interfered; (2) the only damages ASI sought concerned lost profits related to the Z82 Project; and 
(3) the Court's initial unwillingness to dismiss the claim on the basis that Zilog was not a third 
party to ASI's alleged expectancy, Zilog submitted proposed jury instruction No. 6 containing 
the question: 
Did Zilog intentionally interfere with American Semiconductor's economic 
expectancy of contracting with Zilog? 
Tr p. 2649, LL. 18-20. 
ASI objected to the jury instruction on the grounds that its claim was "expectancy of 
future pecuniary gain from its relationships with its employees, separate and apart, distinct from 
[its claim for TIWK]." Judge Neville expressed that he was surprised by ASI's claim: 
THE COURT: There's no evidence about others, other than Zilog. The - the 
only thing this could apply to would be Zilog. 
I - I think you have two choices here; you can ask to drop this claim, or you can 
have it go forward in its current version on the on the Special Verdict Form .... 
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deliberation, that not 
worded because Zilog was not a third party to the expectancy: 
MR. ZARIAN: Your Honor, with respect to Question 6 on the Special Verdict 
Form, I do not think we can proceed to try this claim, as - as it's been worded, 
to the jury, in light of Instruction No. 16, which requires that the expectation of 
entry into a business relationship be with a third party. So, I think - I think, as 
framed, this claim would be precluded, and we would not be able to proceed on 
it. 
as 
Tr p. 2665, L. 24 - p. 2666, L. 6 ( emphasis added). Despite this acknowledgement, ASI refused 
to drop its TIWPEA claim against Zilog. 
THE COURT: Well, I -- I didn't think it was a winner, that's for sure, and I --
I'm not surprised by your decision. So, you want to withdraw that claim? 
MR. ZARIAN: No, Your Honor. 
For the record, I don't think it's our claim. I -- I, respectfully, as articulated in 
paragraph 90 of our -- of our complaint, I understand the Court is -- is making 
some rulings, and -- and we will obviously respect and honor that, but we're not 
withdrawing it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You're not withdrawing it. So, you want it to say: Did Zilog 
tortiously interfere with American Semiconductor, Inc.'s prospective economic 
advantage? 
MR. ZARIAN: Expect -- expectancy, yes, with -- with its employees, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, you -- well, I'm looking at last night's, from Mr. Luvai, 
simply says, did Zilog -- you would have me say tortiously interfere with 
American Semiconductor's prospective economic advantage, period. That's 
where you stop. 
MR. ZARIAN: Yes, Your Honor. That -- that would -- that would also be --
that -- that's a claim we could -- we could -- we could argue. 
THE COURT: But that doesn't help the jury know what that claim is, it doesn't 
even tell - it's just - it's just out there. It's not specific enough to frame the 
issue, I don't think. 
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verdict, dismissing ASI's TIWPEA claim because ASI had introduced no evidence of any 
damages or expectancy, aside from those related to the Zilog Z82 Project: 
THE COURT: I -- I -- I think -- I don't see how this claim can go forward. It's 
too vague as requested. I don't know that I understand the claim, I don't know 
how the jury would. 
I -- the Court possibly should revisit its motion for directed verdict and simply 
take this one out. And -- and, frankly, I think I'm doing your client a favor by 
focusing on the stronger -- this one is so weak, it's -- it's sinking of it's own -- I 
mean, it's - if this were a ship, it's got more holes than it does integrity of the 
hull. 
THE COURT: -- I'm -- I'm going to reconsider and grant the directed verdict 
motion against the claim for economic expectancy, by AS/, against Zilog, for -
for basically no evidence, not - not even close to substantial evidence. 
And I -- I thought Mr. Husch' s argument the other day was a terribly strong one. 
Judges tend to be very cautious about granting directed verdict motions; it's no 
secret. But I think that this -- this is - this doesn't make sense. I -- / just think 
there's -- there's no evidence. There's not only not substantial evidence, there's 
no evidence. 
Tr p. 2668, L. 8 - p. 2669, L. 8 (emphasis added). 
Although the District Court granted Zilog's motion for directed verdict as to ASI's 
TIWPEA claim against Zilog, ASI was still able to present its claim for intentional interference 
with ASI's employment contracts with the Individual Defendants to the jury, and the jury 
returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Zilog. See Special Verdict Form: 
QUESTION NO. 6: Did Zilog, Inc. intentionally interfere with American 
Semiconductor, Inc.' s contracts with the individual Sage defendants? 
YES NO X 
R 1632-1636, at 1634. 
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claim against Zilog TIWPEA fails as a matter law 
because Zilog was not a third party to ASPs alleged economic 
expectancy. 
To establish its TIWPEA claim against Zilog, ASI was required to show (1) the existence 
of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer, 
(3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy, (4) the interference was 
wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, and (5) resulting damage to 
the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 
138, 191 P.3d 205,216 (2008). 
ASI' s contention on appeal-that its TIWPEA claim has remained consistent-is 
unsupported by the record. In its Second Amended Complaint, ASI pled that Zilog's 
"solicitation or acceptance of the services of the Individuals and Sage would, and did, interfere 
with American Semiconductor's provision of services to third parties." R 433-454, at 445-446 
(emphasis added). ASI acknowledged that if ASI's claim were based on its economic 
expectancy of contracting with Zilog, that claim could not go forward. See Tr p. 2665, L. 24 -
p. 2666, L. 10. 
Although ASI may have had an expectation of earning profits from the outsourced design 
services of its employees separate and apart from work outsourced to ASI from Zilog, the only 
evidence of "profit" ASI introduced at trial concerned lost profit from "design work that would 
have been outsourced to AS/from Zilog." ASI Op. Brief at 43.4 
4 See also ASI Op. Brief at 36 ("By secretly co-opting the services of the Engineers, Zilog deprived AS/ of design work on the 6482 project that, in light of Zilog' s obvious interest in the 
services of the Engineers, should properly have been routed through ASI as their known 
employer."); ASI Op. Brief at 48 ("AS! presented extensive testimony from its damages expert, 
Richard Hoffman, who testified as to the profits ASI would have realized from contracting with 
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admitted that his damages calculation-the only evidence of damages presented at 
trial-related solely to damages resulting from Zilog' s retention of Sage rather than ASL In his 
report, Hoffman stated that he had "been asked to calculate the amount of Lost Profits that ASI 
suffered as a result of Zilog's engagement of Sage instead of ASL" R 4089 (emphasis added). 
In his trial testimony, Hoffman stated: 
Q. What were you asked to do in in this matter. 
A. I was asked to measure damage -- measure the damage calculations for 
this case, what ASI has suffered if the jury determines that they would have 
otherwise gotten the project that's at issue in this case. 
Tr. p. 2063, LL. 11-16. Hoffman's admissions are consistent with Judge Neville's 
characterization of ASI's claim, contrary to ASI's argument on appeal. See ASI Op. Brief at 
36-37, 39-40. 
As presented at trial, ASI's TIWPEA claim against Zilog failed as a matter of law. 
Although ASI argued that Zilog interfered with its economic advantage of receiving "profit" 
from the outsourced design services of its employees, the only evidence of such alleged "profit" 
ASI introduced at trial was lost profit from the Z82 Project. Thus, ASI's entire claim is 
dependent upon a prospective contract between ASI and Zilog. 
ASI' s TIWPEA claim against Zilog must fail under Idaho law because Zilog was not a 
true third party--or "stranger"-to the economic expectancy at issue. In BECO Construction 
Co. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., this Court set forth the general rule that "[s]ince a party cannot 
Zilog on the project.") (emphasis added); id at 43 ("damages associated with that expectancy [ASI's employment relationship with the Engineers] were profits from design work that would 
have been outsourced to ASI from Zilog, among others."). 
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it an contract 
can only lie against a third party." 145 Idaho 9, 724, citing Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993). In so holding, this Court relied 
upon 44B AM. JuR. 2D Interference § 7, which contains a line of cases holding that all parties to 
an interwoven contractual arrangement are not liable for tortious interference with any of the 
contracts or business relationships. Id, 145 Idaho 719, 724, 184 P.3d 844, 849 (2008). 
Specifically, the article from American Jurisprudence (Second) provides in pertinent part: 
A person must be a stranger to a contract to tortiously interfere with it.. A claim 
for tortious interference with contractual relations requires proof that the 
defendant is a stranger to the contract with which the defendant allegedly 
interfered and to the business relationship giving rise to the contract. One 
contracting party does not have a cause of action in interference against the other 
contracting party for tortious interference. A party cannot interfere with its own 
contracts, so the tort can be committed only by a third party. Similarly, to be 
liable for tortious interference with business relations, one must be a stranger to 
the business relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract. 
All parties to an interwoven contractual arrangement are not liable for tortious 
interference with any of the contracts or business relationships. 
The applicability of the "stranger doctrine" is the same/or tortious interference 
with a business relationship as for tortious interference with a contractual 
relationship. 
44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 7 ( emphasis added), citing Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall Cnty., 
281 Ga. App. 825,830,637 S.E.2d 763, 769 (2006) ("To be liable for tortious interference with 
business relations, one must be a stranger to the business relationship giving rise to and 
underpinning the contract. But, where a defendant had a legitimate interest in either the contract 
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contract or to 
g1vmg thereto and underpinning the contract.") (emphasis in original; citation omitted).5 
Less than three months after issuing its decision in BECO, this Court held that the 
"stranger doctrine" applied equally to TIWPEA claims because, among other things, "the torts of 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and intentional interference with 
contract are similar" and "cases and commentary addressing the two torts often apply 
interchangeably for proving the common elements." Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 
138 n.5, 191 P.3d 205, 216 n.5 (2008). In Cantwell, the plaintiff, a former employee of the City 
of Boise, sued his former supervisors for TIWPEA on the theory that they had "significantly 
impaired his prospective ability to enforce his right to maintain employment with the City." 146 
Idaho at 137, 191 P.3d at 215. This Court rejected plaintiff's theory, holding that Cantwell failed 
to state a claim for TIWPEA because Cantwell failed to establish that a third party had 
interfered with his prospective economic relationship with the City. 146 Idaho at 137-38, 191 
P.3d at 215-16 (emphasis added). 
The same result applies here. The only expectancy as to which ASI presented any 
evidence was its expectancy of using its employees to perform work on Zilog's Z82 Project. 
Zilog was a necessary party to ASI's claimed expectancy between ASI and its employees, not a 
5 See also MAC East, LLC v. Shoney's, 535 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2008) ("A defendant 
is not a stranger to a contract or business relationship when '(1) the defendant is an essential 
entity to the purported injured relations; (2) the allegedly injured relations are inextricably a 
part of or dependent upon the defendant's contractual or business relations; (3) the defendant 
would benefit economically from the alleged injured relations; or ( 4) both the defendant and the 
plaintiff are parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of contract relations."') (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added); N Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 5:14-
CV-02371-SGC, 2015 WL 5011346, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 2015) ("[a]n entity is not a 
stranger if it is a 'participant' in a relationship"). 
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as source on 
Project, was the sole source of ASI's alleged economic expectancy. Zilog cannot be liable for 
tortious interference with its own contracts or with business opportunities it provides. 
4, Even if ASl's TIWPEA claim were not premised on ASl's prospective 
relationship with Zilog, ASl's claim still fails because ASI failed to 
introduce evidence of any damage resulting from any other 
expectancy. 
If, as ASI belatedly states in its brief, its TIWPEA claim were not in fact premised on 
ASI's prospective contractual relationship with Zilog, then ASI's claim must fail because ASI 
did not introduce evidence of any damages resulting from the loss of any business expectancy 
other than its alleged expectancy of contracting with Zilog on the Z82 Project. In order to make 
a prima facie TIWPEA claim against Zilog, ASI had the burden of proving "resulting damage to 
the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted." Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 
138, 191 P.3d 205, 216. Although ASI contends that its employment relationships with the 
Individual Defendants were damaged as a result of Zilog's alleged tortious interference, ASI 
failed to introduce any evidence at trial of any damages resulting from any other lost business 
opportunity. 
5. Insofar as ASl's claim of TIWPEA is based on the theory that Zilog 
interfered with ASl's expectancy of profiting from its employee's 
services, that claim fails as a matter of law because that claim was 
based upon ASl's expectancy of continuing its existing 
noncompetition agreements with its employees and could only have 
been brought as a claim for TIWK. 
AS I's TIWPEA claim that Zilog tortiously interfered with ASI's expectancy of profiting 
from the services of the Individual Defendants is not viable because it is based upon the 
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contracts with the Individual Defendants, and must be brought as a TIWK claim.6 
ASI relies on Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 
824 P.2d 841, 841 (1991), which states that the proper cause of action is for TIWPEA, not 
TIWK, where the parties' relationship is simply an at-will relationship that may be terminated by 
either party without liability for breach of contract. This language from Bliss Valley Foods does 
not apply to the case at bar because ASI and the Individual Defendants were not simply parties to 
an at-will employment relationship that could be terminated without liability. Instead, they were 
parties to complex Employee Confidentiality Agreements (see, e.g., Ex. 4), with noncompetition 
provisions (as well as confidentiality, trade secret and intellectual property provisions), the 
breach of which could result in liability for the Individual Defendants. 
6 See D'Andrea v. Rafla-Demetrious, 3 F. Supp. 2d 239, 250 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 146 
F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 1998) (granting summary judgment against plaintiff radiologist on his 
TIWPEA claim against defendants based on their interference with plaintiffs relationship with 
the American Board of Radiology, because plaintiff had an existing contract with the board and 
made no allegation of interference with a future relationship that had not already been formed 
between himself and the board); Stamper v. Chicago Transit Auth., 1997 WL 177844 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (where employee's relationship with employer was governed by an existing employment 
contract, employee "must allege 'tortious interference with [the] contract rather than a 
prospective business advantage"') ( citation omitted); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Pyrrahus AG, 
936 F.2d 921, 934 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff alleged interference with its "reasonable expectation 
of continuing a valid business relationship," and court held that "[ s ]ince this Count alleges an 
already existing relationship, it is a claim for tortious interference with a contract rather than a 
prospective business advantage") ( emphasis added by court); Sabre Int 'l Sec. v. Torres Advanced 
Enter. Solutions, 820 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011) ("To survive a motion to dismiss [a claim of 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage], 'a plaintiff must allege business 
expectancies not grounded in present contractual relationships .... "') ( citation omitted); Egrets 
Pointe Townhouses Prop. Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 110 (D.S.C. 
1994) ( existence of valid contract "precludes any recovery on a claim for interference with 
prospective contractual relations"). 
27 
finding that Zilog did not tortiously interfere with ASI' s noncompetes with its 
employees. ASI did not appeal the jury verdict in favor of Zilog. ASI is precluded on appeal 
from continuing to advance arguments that Zilog induced the Individual Defendants to violate 
their duties not to compete with ASL 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying ASI's Motion to 
Compel Zilog to Produce Its Licensing Agreement with Synopsys, Inc. 
1. Standard of review re: evidentiary rulings. 
Judge Neville's denial of ASI's motion to compel and subsequent denial of ASI's motion 
in limine are to be reviewed for "clear abuse of discretion." See, e.g., Ketterling v. Burger King 
Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 561-562, 272 P.3d 527, 533-534 (2012) (district court's denial of 
plaintiffs motion to compel disclosure of franchise agreement with third party, after reviewing 
document in camera and finding it not relevant under Rule 26, was reviewed for clear abuse of 
discretion); Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005), 
citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767, 86 P.3d 
475, 481 (2004) ("This Court reviews the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion in 
limine under an abuse of discretion standard."). 
"The burden of showing the trial court abused its discretion rests with the appellant." 
Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 559, 261 P.3d 829, 836 (2011) (citations omitted). 
"[W]hen appealing from an evidentiary ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must demonstrate both the trial court's abuse of discretion and that the error affected a 
substantial right." Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Taylor v. AJA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 559, 261 P.3d 
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erroneous must 
a "substantial " See ASI Brief at 19. ASI' s contention that a de nova standard of 
review applies and ignores the foregoing authority, especially Ketterling.7 
2. Background re third-party licenses. 
a. Synopsys expressly objects to the disclosure of its confidential 
license agreements. 
On March 20, 2014, ASI served a Notice of Subpoena Duces Tecum to Synopsys 
(R 664-665; R 783-786), seeking production of all (1) agreements containing provisions in 
which Synopsys grants Zilog a license to make use of Synopsys' software or software-related 
tools, (2) agreements that reflect, constitute or contain restrictions or limitations as to authorized 
sites or locations wherein Zilog may make use of the software or software-related tools; and 
(3) agreements containing provisions limiting, restricting or regulating the disclosure of 
confidential or commercially sensitive information. R 783-785. 
Synopsys objected to ASI's subpoena and did not produce any records. R 900-903, 905 
("Synopsys' Objections"). Thereafter, in a letter to ASI's counsel dated April 28, 2014, 
Synopsys explained its prior objections in pertinent part as follows: 
We respond to your letter dated April 16, 2014 regarding Synopsys' objections to 
ASl's Subpoena. *** 
7 See also I.R.E. 103( a) ("[ e ]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected."); I.R.C.P. 61 ("[a]t every 
stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors or defects that do not affect any 
party's substantial rights."); Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 
986 (2004) ("This Court will not reverse the trial court if an alleged error is harmless .... [l]f an 
error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result of the trial, the 
error is harmless and not grounds for reversal."). 
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is nothing apparent from the information you provided that leads us to 
believe that "the use of Synopsys-provided tools and the licenses agreements 
governing use of such tools are issues that were injected into {your] lawsuit." 
The fact that a completely unrelated third party, also located in California, 
responded to a similar subpoena makes no difference. ASI is not entitled to 
discovery from Synopsys unless it can establish that the discovery it seeks meets 
the Rule 26(b )(1) standard. The deposition transcript excerpts you provided fail to 
demonstrate any relevance of the requested information to ASI' s case. At best, 
they demonstrate that Synopsys tools were mentioned during two depositions in 
your case. The mere mention of a Synopsys tool, however, does not 
automatically render any discovery regarding Synopsys' confidential 
agreements or any other Synopsys documentation relevant to your action. 
R 939-940 (emphasis added). 
b. ASI moved to compel Zilog to produce third-party license 
agreements over the objections of Zilog's third-party vendor. 
Having failed to obtain the license agreements from Synopsys, ASI moved the District 
Court for entry of an order compelling Zilog to tum over the same agreements. R 666-669; 788-
804. Zilog objected to the disclosure of the third-party license agreements on the basis that the 
agreements contained confidentiality provisions that prohibited their disclosure .. R 869-887. In 
pertinent part, Zilog counsel advised ASI counsel: 
The appropriate procedural process to obtain this information is via third party 
discovery, a process that ASI admits it has instituted. Third party discovery 
would permit parties to the license agreements, whose rights may be effected [sic] 
by disclosure to ASI, to participate in the dispute. This is especially important in 
this case. Zilog's license agreements with all three (3) third parties -- Synopsys, 
Cadence and CAST -- contain language that prohibits Zilog from disclosing the 
license agreements to ASL 
Rat 874 (Zilog's Memo in Opposition to ASl's Motion to Compel). 
On May 2, 2014, Judge Neville heard oral argument on ASI's motion to compel Zilog to 
produce its third-party agreements. At the hearing, Zilog reiterated that ASI should be required 
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consent to disclosure of the license agreements, Zilog would produce them to ASI: 
[JU ASI would go to these parties and obtain their written consent to disclosure 
of these agreements, we would have no objection to disclosing them. But to 
require us to produce them, in light of these confidentiality provisions, is 
improper. And ASI, in its own papers, has objected to producing agreements 
between ASI and third parties, on the grounds that they're protected by 
confidentiality provisions that prohibit ASI from disclosing those documents. 
So, I think what's good for the goose is good for the gander, Your Honor. And 
we should hear from Cast [sic], Cadence, and Synopsis [sic], and -- have their 
consent to production of these documents, or their explanation to the Court as to 
what their interests are that warrant the prohibition of the production of the 
documents. 
Tr p. 195, L. 18 - p. 196, L. 8 ( emphasis added). 
At the May 2 hearing Judge Neville denied ASI's motion to compel, citing to Jen-Rath 
Co. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330, 336, 48 P.3d 659, 665 (2002). Tr p. 200, L. 11 - p. 202, 
L. 19. Specifically, the District Court held as follows: 
Cast [sic], Cadence, and Synopsis [sic] are not parties to this action. Zilog claims 
that the third-party software vendors consider their licensing agreements 
confidential. 
The Court is not convinced, at this point, that the requests for the software -- the 
software licensing agreements between Zilog and its vendors is reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Rather, it seems, to the 
Court at least, to be pointed at proving or disproving Zilog's claim that it cannot 
provide ASI with software for purposes of this litigation, which is an issue about 
whether ASI can review certain documents [in electronic form previously 
produced in discovery] and not about the discoverability of documents. 
It seems to me that this portion of the motion to compel should be denied. 
Tr p. 201, L. 23 -p. 202, L. 13. 
Thereafter, ASI did not move to reconsider Judge Neville's adverse discovery ruling at 
any time prior to trial. Neither did ASI move to compel production pursuant to the third-party 
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on consent 
licensing agreements. 
c. ASI files a motion in limine on the eve of trial. 
Instead, five months after Judge Neville's discovery ruling, ASI filed a motion in limine 
(R 1255-1257) and supporting memorandum (R 1248-1269), seeking to preclude Zilog from 
introducing any evidence at trial that Zilog had the Design Tools necessary to complete the Z82 
Project. In response to ASI's motion in limine, Zilog lodged the subject document with the 
District Court for its review, in camera. On December 9, 2014, Judge Neville denied ASI's 
motion in limine and refused to order disclosure of the document, stating in pertinent part: 
THE COURT: I think it's a novel argument to say that the Court should grant a 
motion in limine because Counsel moving for that was earlier unsuccessful on 
their motion to compel. And that, therefore, they're trying to enforce the motion 
to compel. 
It -- it seems like an extreme remedy to a motion made long ago and never 
revisited, never sought to be reconsidered. 
I -- I am simply not persuaded that the total charges or fees, whatever that total 
figure is that's in the -- the document before me, is -- is relevant because IXYS 
had paid that -- for that, and not contractors, not consultants, and they had paid 
that bill, whatever it was. And I don't -- the Court doesn't see any real possibility 
or likelihood that, frankly, a subsidiary, an authorized subsidiary of IXYS, would 
pay any contractor or consultant for tools it already had. I -- I just don't see how 
this is relevant still. 
And I don't see the prejudice here to - to plaintiff. It's - it's the law of the 
case. Plaintiff knows what it would have cost plaintiff to acquire these same 
tools from these same providers. And so, it's not precluded from putting 
together a bid, and knowing what its costs would have been, and how it might 
have allocated those costs to a bid, if it had had an opportunity to make one. 
Tr p. 1307, L. 7 - p. 1308, L. 17 ( emphasis added). 
Although Judge Neville denied ASI's motion in limine, ASI was not precluded from 
examining defendants or their witnesses about what Design Tools Zilog used on the Z82 Project. 
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Tr p. 2325, IO - p. 2326, L. 11. Specifically, the Court explained to ASI at trial: 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Well, I mean, I -- I've given you fair leeway to inquire about what tools whoever 
had and what tools they needed. And to go into licensing agreements, that's water 
under the bridge as there's not been a statement of -- that I can figure -- or I can 
figure out how that's relevant. It's been the subject of a -- of this Non-Disclosure 
-- it's been -- it's been the subject of ... multiple motions and a confidentiality 
agreement between the vendor and Zilog. 
And I -- this is all a matter of record; the cost and -- and all of that. But what 
tools AS/ had, what tools Zilog had, based on their 2004 license, what tools 
other vendors that might be considered had, whether or not Zilog wanted to hire 
a contractor with their own tools or not, all those things are - are fair game, 
but licensing is the only area that I'm -- that I've Counsel to stay on, based on the 
substantial law of the case and history here. 
Tr p. 2326, L. 24-p. 2327, L. 17 (emphasis added). 
3. Judge Neville did not abuse his discretion in denying ASl's motion to 
compel. 
ASI's contentions on appeal-that Judge Neville erred in denying ASl's motion 
to compel production of the Synopsys license and improperly engaged in an ex parte process and 
made credibility determinations-not only lack merit but also contain a spurious attack on the 
ethics of the District Court. ASI was neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the 
Synopsys license. On appeal, however, ASI takes the position that Judge Neville's discovery 
ruling hindered ASI' s ability to prove that if ASI had submitted a bid on the Z82 Project its bid 
would have been competitive rather than too expensive. This contention also lacks merit. 
During trial ASI admitted that ASI did not even have a contractual relationship 
with Synopsys that would have enabled ASI to use Synopsys Design Tools during the relevant 
time period. Tr p. 1336, L. 22 - p. 1337, L. 1. Separately, there is no evidence in the record that 
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these facts, ASI filed a motion on April 18, 2014, to compel Zilog to produce a copy of 
Zilog's license agreements with its third-party Design Tool vendors, including Synopsys. 
(R 666-669; R 788-804 at 797-798). Prior to filing the motion to compel ASI served Synopsys 
with a third-party subpoena seeking to compel the very license agreements at issue. R 783-785. 
ASI was aware as of April 18, 2014, that Synopsys objected to disclosure of its license 
agreements because the agreements were "irrelevant" and contained "confidential information 
belonging to Synopsys and its customers subject to third party confidentiality agreements." 
Synopsys, Inc.'s Response to American Semiconductor, Inc.'s Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
Synopsys, Inc. (R 900-903, 905) (emphasis added) ("Synopsys' Objections"). In a follow-up 
letter to ASI's counsel, Synopsys reiterated its objections and expressly rejected ASI's 
contention that the terms and conditions of its license agreement with Zilog were "injected" into 
the lawsuit simply because Synopsys tools were mentioned in connection with the Z82 Project. 
R 939-940. 
Despite this knowledge, ASI engaged in an ex parte process wherein ASI sought 
an order from Judge Neville compelling Zilog to produce the Synopsys license without notice to 
Synopsys. In addition, in its moving papers, ASI did not disclose Synopsys' Objections to the 
District Court. Zilog defended the motion to compel, in large part, on the basis that Synopsys 
considered its agreement confidential and objected to the disclosure. Although Zilog objected to 
the motion to compel, Zilog's counsel represented at the hearing on the motion to compel that if 
ASI would simply obtain Synopsys' written consent to disclosure, Zilog would not object to 
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4. Judge Neville properly exercised his discretion in denying ASl's 
motion in limine. 
The hearing on ASI's motion to compel occurred on May 2, 2014. Zilog is not 
aware of any effort taken by ASI after that date either to obtain Synopsys' written consent to the 
disclosure of the license agreements or to enforce ASI's third-party subpoena. Instead, on the 
eve of trial, ASI filed a motion in limine (R 1255-1257) and supporting memorandum (R 1258-
1269), seeking to preclude Zilog from introducing any evidence that Zilog had the Design Tools 
necessary to complete the Z82 Project. Judge Neville denied ASI's motion in limine opining that 
it is a "novel argument to say that the Court should grant a motion in limine because Counsel 
moving for that was earlier unsuccessful on their motion to compel. And that, therefore, they're 
trying to enforce the motion to compel. It -- it seems like an extreme remedy to a motion made 
long ago and never revisited, never sought to be reconsidered." Tr p. 1307, L. 7 - p. 1308, 
L. 16 ( emphasis added). 
Although Judge Neville denied ASI's motion in limine, he correctly noted that 
ASI did not need the Synopsys agreement in order to identify what it would have cost ASI to 
acquire Synopsys tools. See Tr p. 1307, L. 7 - p. 1308, L. 16 ("[ASI] knows what it would have 
cost plaintiff to acquire these same tools from these same providers. And so, it's not precluded 
from putting together a bid, and knowing what its costs would have been, and how it might have 
8 For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Section IV.A through C of the Sage 
Defendants' Brief, which Zilog incorporates herein by reference, it is clear that the District Court 
did not err in its ruling on ASI's motion to compel or motion in limine or the evidentiary rulings 
regarding license agreements and the terms of the licenses. 
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means to address its evidentiary burden of proof, but chose not to do so. Instead, ASI chose not 
to put on any evidence at trial of what it would have cost ASI to obtain a Synopsys license and 
proceeded to trial with a damages model that "assumed" Zilog would agree to use different 
Design Tools. Thus, no substantial right of ASI was harmed by the District Court's ruling on 
ASI's motion in limine. 
5. Judge Neville did not resort to an unfair ex parte process. 
According to ASI, Judge Neville's review of the Synopsys agreement in camera 
"raises important fairness concerns that implicate ASI's right to due process in this civil legal 
proceeding." ASI Op. Brief at 29. ASI cites no authority as to why the District Court's 
in camera inspection of the license agreement constituted an unfair process that was prejudicial 
to ASI, and ASI's argument should therefore be rejected. See Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 
374, 234 P.3d 696 (2010) (this Court will not consider an issue that is not supported by argument 
and authority in the opening brief). 
The issue whether a trial court errs in denying a motion to compel after reviewing 
the subject document in camera has been recently addressed by this Court. See Ketterling v. 
Burger King Corp., 152 Idaho 555, 561-62, 272 P.3d 527, 533-34 (2012). In that case, the trial 
court reviewed in camera a franchise agreement between the defendant and a third party, 
determined that the agreement did not contain information relevant to the plaintiffs action and 
denied plaintiffs motion to compel disclosure of the agreement. Id The plaintiff appealed the 
trial court's order, arguing that the "district court's decision was in error because it did not make 
any finding that the agreement contained privileged information and because [plaintiff] did not 
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the trial court's order and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's motion to compel. Id at 562, 272 P.3d at 534. This Court's decision in Kettering 
compels the conclusion that the District Court in the case at bar did not abuse its discretion in 
reviewing the Synopsys license agreement in camera. Furthermore, ASI's alleged fairness 
concerns are especially ironic given that ASI sought to compel production of Synopsys' 
confidential license agreement using an ex parte process and with actual knowledge that 
Synopsys objected to its disclosure. 
6. Any error committed by the District Court in not compelling 
disclosure of the third-party license agreement was harmless. 
"[W]hen appealing from an evidentiary ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
the appellant must demonstrate both the trial court's abuse of discretion and that the error 
affected a substantial right." Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415, 
420 (2012) (internal citations omitted). According to ASI, its "substantial rights" were affected 
by Judge Neville's discovery rulings in two ways. First, ASI was "precluded from presenting 
evidence to the jury that tended to show that Zilog did not have the relevant licensing agreements 
in place prior to or at the time the Sage Defendants worked on the 6482 Project, thus providing a 
plausible basis for the jury to find that ASI's bid for the same work would have been, 
competitive as opposed to being 'too expensive."' ASI Op. Brief at 32. Second, ASI contends 
that it was precluded from impeaching defense witnesses "with regard to whether Zilog did, in 
point of fact, have the tools and license in place as of March 2011 when the Sage Defendants 
commenced work on the 6482 Project." Id at 33. 
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a. ASI lacks a good faith basis for contending that Zilog did not 
have a Synopsys license in place prior to or at the time Sage 
and the Individual Defendants worked on the Z82 Project. 
It is axiomatic that Zilog had to have Design Tools for Sage to do its work on the 
Z82 Project and for Zilog to complete that work using its own internal resources after Sage left 
the project. Although ASI never submitted a bid to Zilog to work on the Z82 Project, the District 
Court permitted ASI to submit a damages model to the jury wherein ASI contended that it would 
have charged Zilog $1.2 million dollars over the course of the Z82 Project. Of that amount, 
about $810,000 related directly to Design Tool costs. ASI admittedly did not have a Synopsys 
license, the primary Design Tool used by Zilog and Sage on the Z82 Project, or Synopsys Design 
Tools. ASI could not have charged Zilog for the use of tools that ASI admitted it did not have, 
without recognizing the cost of obtaining those tools. 
ASI is aware, from the District Court's disclosure of terms of the license, that the 
Synopsys license agreement in the Court's possession is an addendum to a master license going 
back to 2004. More importantly, although Synopsys has objected to disclosure of its license 
agreement, Synopsys never denied that Zilog lacked the requisite license in the first place. 
Instead, consistent with Judge Neville's ruling, Synopsys refused to tum over its confidential 
agreements, because ASI failed to establish that the discovery it sought met the Rule 26(b )(1) 
standard. R 939-940. 
Finally, Judge Neville's discovery ruling did not preclude ASI from examining 
defendants or their witnesses about what Design Tools were used on the Z82 Project. Similarly, 
the District Court did not preclude ASI from introducing testimony about what Design Tools ASI 
had or would have needed to purchase. See Tr p. 2325, L. 10 - p. 2326, L. 11; Tr p. 2326, 24 
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appeal that Zilog did not in fact have a license with Synopsys as of February or March 2011. 
b. ASI should be judicially estopped from asserting on appeal 
that disclosure of license agreements is "critical" to 
establishing that a party had Design Tools. 
Separately, ASI should be estopped from taking the position that Judge Neville 
erred in failing to compel production of the Synopsys license and that disclosure of the Synopsys 
license is dispositive as to whether Zilog actually had a license with Synopsys in February 2011. 
"Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently 
seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first." McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 
891,894,303 P.3d 578,581 (2013) (citation omitted). The policy behind judicial estoppel is to 
preserve "the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the orderly administration of justice 
and having regard for the dignity of the judicial proceeding." Id (quotation marks omitted). 
"Broadly accepted, it is intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal 
system." Id. 
ASI had the burden of proving damages at trial with a reasonable degree of 
certainty. Yet during trial, ASI failed to introduce its third-party license agreements with its 
Design Tool vendors in support of its contention that it had Design Tool licenses as of February 
2011. Rather, ASI refused to produce its license agreements to Zilog on the basis that its 
licenses were "irrelevant" to the lawsuit and that disclosure may result in a "breach by ASI of 
an obligation to a third-party to maintain such information as confidential." See R 4977-
4982, at 4981. ASI, having chosen to take the position that license agreements were "irrelevant" 
and thereby avoiding production of those agreements, is estopped from now arguing not only 
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a 
c. The inability to impeach witnesses is not a basis for reversal of 
a discovery ruling. 
In ASI's second assignment of error, ASI contends that "ASI was precluded from 
impeaching defense witnesses, specifically Mr. Staab and Mr. Reinstein" because the District 
Court refused to order production of the Synopsys license. This Court has held that a trial 
court's error in excluding impeachment evidence "is harmless under I.R.C.P. 61 because failure 
to impeach is not inconsistent with substantial justice and does not affect a substantial right of 
the party." Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 887, 173 P.3d 1141, 1146 (2007) (emphasis 
added). 
Moreover, ASI's contention that defendants' rebuttal damages expert, Dennis 
Reinstein, made "outcome determinative assumptions with regard to design tools, underscoring 
the relevance of the licensing agreements" (ASI Op. Brief at 20) misstates the record and 
Reinstein's testimony (id. at 24). Contrary to ASI's contention, Reinstein testified that he was 
never provided and never reviewed Zilog's third-party licenses. R 5044. Reinstein further 
testified that he did not recall having a conversation with either Dalrymple or Staab on the 
subjects of allocating any license cost for tools, industry practices or any convention in the 
industry concerning the proper cost allocation of licenses for such tools, or whether the 
Individual Defendants had a lawful right to use any tools licensed by Zilog in connection with 
their work on the 282 Project. Id. A review of the transcript reveals that it was ASI-not 
Zilog-that attempted to inject the terms and conditions of Zilog's license agreements into the 
lawsuit. See R 5044 (Reinstein rough draft deposition excerpts, p. 6, L. 23 p. 7, L. 14). 
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ASI standing to challenge terms conditions 
Zilog's license with Synopsys. 
Separately, ASI lacked standing to challenge the terms and conditions of Zilog's 
use of its license with Synopsys because ASI was not a party to or a third-party beneficiary of the 
Synopsys licensing agreement. The rules governing the admissibility of evidence have no 
application to the issue of standing. Fenwick v. Idaho Dep 't of Lands, 144 Idaho 318, 324, 160 
P.3d 757, 763 (2007). It is well settled Idaho law that one must have standing in order to enforce 
the terms of a contract and that one who is neither a party to nor a third-party beneficiary of the 
contract lacks standing to enforce its terms. See Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 
Idaho 957,963,354 P.3d 1172, 1178 (2015). 
7. Any error committed by the District Court in not compelling 
disclosure of the third-party license agreement was invited by ASI. 
"It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of 
errors one has acquiesced in or invited. Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not 
reversible." Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 833, 243 P.3d 642, 649 (2010) (quoting State 
v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436,438 (1983) (internal citation omitted)). At the time 
the District Court denied ASI's motion to compel in May 2014, ASI had served a third-party 
subpoena on Synopsys. ASI knew that Zilog would not oppose disclosure of the Synopsys 
license if ASI could obtain Synopsys' consent to disclosure, yet ASI apparently made no effort to 
enforce the third-party subpoena or to obtain Synopsys' consent. Nor did ASI seek 
reconsideration of its motion to compel. Instead ASI waited until trial to file its motion 
in limine. ASI, having failed to lift a finger to utilize the proper avenue for production of the 
third-party agreement, can hardly predicate reversible error on the District Court's order. 
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Holding the Prevailing 
On February 23, 2015, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order 
Re: Attorney Fees and Costs (R 2114-2134). Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(B) of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Judge Neville properly exercised his discretion in determining that Zilog was 
the prevailing party. R 2114-2134, at 2116, citing Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic Physicians, 
PLLC, 152 Idaho 540, 545, 272 P.3d 512, 517 (2012); Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord 
Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). Judge Neville's 
prevailing party determination is well-supported by the record. 
ASI's case against Zilog began primarily as a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. In 
the Second Amended Complaint, ASI alleged five separate causes of action against Zilog. Three 
of those five claims related to ASI's contention that Zilog misappropriated AS I's trade secrets. 
Prior to trial, ASI withdrew its trade secret claims when it became beyond obvious that ASI 
could not identify any such trade secret. At trial, Judge Neville dismissed ASI's claim for 
TIWPEA because ASI had failed to introduce evidence supporting its theory that it expected to 
earn profit from the design services of its engineers apart from Zilog. The issue whether Zilog 
tortiously interfered with ASI's employment contracts with its employees was submitted to the 
jury. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Zilog. Thereafter, Judge Neville entered 
an order finding that "ASI pursued its trade secret claims without foundation from May 23, 2014 
through August 19, 2014." Based on the overall result, Judge Neville exercised his discretion in 
determining that Zilog was the prevailing party. This holding is well supported by the facts and 
the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
the foregoing reasons, Zilog respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District 
Court's holdings and award Zilog its reasonable costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 2016. 
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